What if the assessment of limited effect of military strikes is correct?

Iran has achieved the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium within one week, possessing 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium as of May 2025 – sufficient material for 9-10 nuclear weapons if further enriched. Despite unprecedented Israeli and US military strikes on nuclear facilities in June 2025, intelligence assessments indicate the attacks set back Iran’s program by only months rather than years, with core uranium stockpiles preserved and thousands of backup centrifuges remaining intact. The complete breakdown of diplomatic efforts, including failed US-Iran negotiations and the effective death of the JCPOA, has created what experts call the world’s first “threshold war” – military action specifically aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. This dramatic escalation represents a fundamental shift in how the international community addresses nuclear threats, with Iran now weeks away from weapons capability and increasingly motivated to cross the nuclear threshold as its ultimate security guarantee.

Technical capabilities reach unprecedented levels despite military intervention

Iran’s nuclear program has achieved capabilities that fundamentally alter Middle Eastern strategic calculations. The Islamic Republic now operates 21,900 installed centrifuges across multiple facilities, with 18,000 actively enriching uranium. Most critically, Iran has mastered advanced centrifuge technology, deploying hundreds of IR-6 models at the deeply buried Fordow facility that can produce 60% enriched uranium at accelerated rates. Monthly production has surged from 4.7 kg to 37 kg of 60% enriched uranium after Iran began feeding 20% enriched material into these advanced cascades.

The significance of these technical achievements cannot be overstated. With 408.6 kg of 60% enriched uranium stockpiled, Iran requires minimal additional enrichment to reach the 90% threshold for weapons-grade material. The Institute for Science and International Security calculates that using just four advanced centrifuge cascades at Fordow, Iran could produce the first 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium – enough for one nuclear weapon – in merely 2-3 days. Within three weeks, the country could accumulate 233 kg of weapons-grade uranium, sufficient for nine nuclear weapons.

This dramatic acceleration results from Iran’s systematic expansion of enrichment infrastructure since 2021. The Natanz facility houses the majority of centrifuge operations in both above-ground and underground halls, while Fordow’s location 80-110 meters beneath a mountain provides exceptional protection against military strikes. Isfahan continues uranium conversion activities essential for feeding the enrichment process, while the Arak heavy water reactor project, though delayed until 2026, represents a potential plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons. Iran has also announced construction of a third enrichment facility in response to international pressure, further complicating military planning.

Diplomatic collapse triggers unprecedented military escalation

The timeline of events from 2024 to June 2025 reveals a catastrophic diplomatic failure that culminated in direct military confrontation. Following President Trump’s return to office in January 2025, his administration initiated a final diplomatic push, sending a letter to Supreme Leader Khamenei proposing nuclear negotiations with a 60-day deadline. Five rounds of US-Iran talks mediated by Oman from April to May 2025 initially showed promise, with both sides describing discussions as “constructive.”

However, fundamental disagreements proved insurmountable. The US demanded complete cessation of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, while Iran insisted on its right to peaceful nuclear technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. When Khamenei rejected Trump’s May 16 proposal as “excessive and outrageous,” the diplomatic track effectively ended. The very next day, IAEA inspectors confirmed Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile had reached 9,247.6 kg total, with the critical 60% enriched component at record levels.

Israel’s decision to launch “Operation Rising Lion” on June 13, 2025, transformed the nuclear crisis into open military conflict. The massive air campaign targeted Natanz’s main enrichment halls, Isfahan’s conversion facilities, and surface infrastructure at Fordow. Israeli forces reportedly killed 78 people, including six top nuclear scientists and Iran’s military leadership – Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Revolutionary Guards commander Hossein Salami. Iran’s immediate retaliation with missile salvos against Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa killed dozens and wounded hundreds, marking the first direct military exchange of this magnitude.

The US intervention on June 21-22 through “Operation Midnight Hammer” represented an unprecedented escalation. B-2 stealth bombers dropped 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs on Iranian nuclear sites, with President Trump claiming to have “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s enrichment capabilities. Yet early intelligence assessments painted a starkly different picture, suggesting the strikes achieved only “limited” damage to critical underground infrastructure at Fordow.

Military strikes expose limits of kinetic solutions

Expert analysis reveals fundamental limitations in attempting to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program through military force. The technical challenges of destroying deeply buried facilities like Fordow have proven nearly insurmountable. Located beneath 80-110 meters of mountain rock, Fordow’s main enrichment halls likely survived even the massive ordnance penetrators deployed by US forces. Military analysts from RAND Corporation emphasize that while strikes can achieve temporary disruption, they cannot eliminate nuclear knowledge or Iran’s ability to reconstitute its program.

The dispersed nature of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure compounds these challenges. Unlike Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 or Syria’s covert facility in 2007, Iran operates multiple enrichment sites with built-in redundancy. Intelligence indicates Iran maintains thousands of uninstalled centrifuges that were not present at targeted facilities during the strikes. More critically, Iran reportedly moved significant uranium stockpiles before the attacks, with enriched uranium easily transportable in small, shielded containers.

Iran’s defensive preparations reflect decades of anticipating military action. The country invested heavily in facility hardening, creating tunnel networks and blast-resistant structures. While Israel successfully destroyed Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries in 2024, indigenous systems like the Bavar-373 provide continued coverage. The systematic dispersal of nuclear assets, combined with operational security measures, ensured program survival despite the intensity of recent strikes.

The regional military balance has shifted dramatically following the weakening of Iran’s proxy network. Hezbollah retains less than 30% of its pre-war capabilities, while Hamas’s military infrastructure lies in ruins. This degradation of Iran’s traditional deterrent forces may paradoxically increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons development, as Tehran seeks alternative security guarantees. Military experts warn that strikes intended to prevent proliferation may have convinced Iranian leadership that nuclear weapons represent the only reliable deterrent against existential threats.

International consensus fractures as nuclear order faces collapse

The diplomatic landscape surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has fragmented beyond recognition. European allies found themselves completely blindsided by the June military strikes, having invested significant diplomatic capital in reviving negotiations. The E3 (UK, France, Germany) maintained their preference for diplomatic solutions even after military action commenced, with foreign ministers meeting their Iranian counterpart in Geneva on June 20 – mere hours before US bombers struck Iranian facilities.

The fundamental divergence between American and European approaches reflects deeper disagreements about proliferation challenges. While the US demanded “zero enrichment” as the only acceptable outcome, Europeans showed flexibility on limited enrichment under strict monitoring. France’s threat to trigger the UN snapback mechanism before its October 2025 expiration represents one of the few remaining diplomatic levers, though its effectiveness appears doubtful given current circumstances.

Regional dynamics have shifted dramatically, with Saudi Arabia publicly declaring it would develop nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them. This potential cascade effect threatens to transform the Middle East into a multi-polar nuclear region. The UAE pursues a delicate balance, maintaining economic ties with Iran while hosting US forces. Israel’s decision to act unilaterally, despite Saudi assurances to Iran that it would not allow its territory to be used for attacks, demonstrates the breakdown of regional coordination.

China and Russia have emerged as Iran’s primary diplomatic defenders, though their support remains calculated rather than unconditional. The January 2025 signing of a 20-year comprehensive partnership between Russia and Iran notably excluded mutual defense provisions, suggesting Moscow’s unwillingness to risk direct confrontation with the US over Iran’s nuclear program. China’s role in facilitating sanctions evasion through yuan-denominated oil transactions provides economic lifelines but stops short of direct nuclear assistance.

Nuclear resilience built on indigenous knowledge and strategic redundancy

Intelligence assessments reveal Iran’s nuclear program possesses remarkable resilience rooted in decades of indigenous development. David Albright’s analysis for the Institute for Science and International Security concludes that June 2025 strikes achieved setbacks measured in months rather than years. The preservation of enriched uranium stockpiles, combined with thousands of backup centrifuges, enables rapid reconstitution of enrichment capabilities.

Iran’s indigenous nuclear infrastructure extends beyond physical facilities to encompass a sophisticated knowledge base. The SPND organization, successor to the weapons-focused AMAD project terminated in 2003, maintains critical expertise in weaponization technologies. Despite Israel’s targeted assassination of nine nuclear scientists in their homes during “Operation Narnia,” including AMAD veterans like Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, Iran’s compartmentalized program structure ensures knowledge preservation across multiple sites and personnel.

The sophistication of Iran’s sanctions evasion networks demonstrates strategic adaptation to international pressure. The Zarringhalam brothers’ shadow banking network laundered billions through China, Hong Kong, and the UAE, while cryptocurrency transactions surged 70% to $4.18 billion in outflows during 2024. Front companies like Sahara Thunder procured dual-use technologies, while Chinese and Turkish intermediaries provided critical centrifuge components and materials.

Perhaps most concerning, Iran has accelerated alternative pathway development in response to military pressure. The announcement of a third enrichment facility, renewed activity at military sites like Parchin, and formation of a Thorium Power Company for alternative fissile material production indicate systematic efforts to create redundancy. Advanced computer modeling capabilities may reduce or eliminate the need for physical nuclear testing, while integration with ballistic missile programs continues despite international scrutiny.

Conclusion

The Iran nuclear crisis has crossed a threshold from which there may be no return. Despite the most intensive military campaign ever directed against a nuclear program, Iran retains the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium within days and maintains the infrastructure to support a weapons program. The failure of both maximum pressure campaigns and military strikes to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities demonstrates the limits of coercive approaches to proliferation challenges.

Three critical factors will determine whether Iran makes the final decision to build nuclear weapons. First, the degree of existential threat perceived by Iranian leadership – the elimination of proxy deterrents and direct attacks on the homeland may convince Tehran that only nuclear weapons guarantee regime survival. Second, the October 2025 expiration of JCPOA provisions eliminates the international legal framework constraining Iran’s program, potentially accelerating weapons development. Third, the regional cascade effect, with Saudi Arabia’s declared intention to match Iranian capabilities, creates additional incentives for nuclear advancement.

The emergence of “threshold warfare” – military action specifically targeting nuclear programs – establishes dangerous precedents for international security. Future proliferators will likely pursue deeper underground facilities, greater program dispersal, and accelerated timelines to present fait accompli before military intervention becomes feasible. The intelligence gaps revealed by divergent US and Israeli assessments underscore the challenges of accurately evaluating nuclear intentions, particularly regarding the critical distinction between enrichment capabilities and weaponization activities.

The international community faces a stark choice between accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or pursuing increasingly risky military options with diminishing returns. The narrow window for diplomatic resolution continues to close, while each military escalation strengthens Iranian determination to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Without a fundamental reconsideration of approach, the world may witness not just Iran’s emergence as a nuclear weapons state, but the collapse of the broader non-proliferation regime that has constrained nuclear weapons spread for over half a century.